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Nudging the Criminal Justice System into Listening 
to Crime Victims in Plea Agreements 
 
Dana Pugach* and Michal Tamir 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Victims’ limited ability to compel public prosecution or to influence 
the terms of plea bargains are undoubtedly among the factors contributing 
to the entrenched position of plea bargains.1  The 2004 Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act (CVRA) 2 has given crime victims “the right to participate in 
the system.”3 Specifically, it has conferred standing onto victims and 
granted victims the right to express their opinion about plea bargains in 
court.4 Further, the CVRA allows victims to file for a nondiscretionary 
mandamus writ when their rights have been revoked.5  Filing this writ 
could lead to voiding a plea or a sentence, albeit not to a retrial.  How could 
such a potentially explosive provision – which has been at the core of 
victims’ rights advocacy and scholarship – go under the radar of the vast 
scholarship analyzing the current situation of plea agreements?  This article 
explores the importance of victims’ participation in plea bargains, analyzes 
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 1. Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States 
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 717, 717 n.2  *2006) (mentioning the statutes giving 
victims the right to participate in plea negotiations). 
 2.  Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, Title I, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2261 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. I 2006)) [hereinafter CVRA]. 
 3. 150 CONG. REC. S4237, S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein), https://www.congress.gov/crec/2004/04/22/CREC-2004-04-22-senate.pdf. 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006). 
 5. The statute, the constitutional amendment efforts that preceded it, and a review of 
state constitutions, are discussed in Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ 
Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 255, 350–54 (2005); Paul G. 
Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 4 UTAH L. REV. 861, 865–70 (2007). 
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the obstacles to its fulfillment, and suggests a way to overcome at least 
some of its major hurdles. 
In recent years, the criminal justice system has changed dramatically in 
numerous respects.  First, plea agreements have grown to become the rule 
in the criminal justice system (CJS), rather than trials.6  Ultimately, the 
courts have started to realize the importance of regulating pleas, in as much 
as defendants’ rights were concerned.7  Second, victims’ rights have been 
recognized and enshrined in a growing body of legislation, from state 
constitutions to federal laws, including far-reaching participation rights in 
pleabargaining.8  Due to the dominance of plea agreements in the criminal 
justice process, the importance of victims’ rights in plea agreements has 
become pivotal.  The more prevalent plea agreements are, the more 
relevant they are to the victims’ lives, rights, and the fulfillment of those 
rights. 
While victims’ rights scholarship has emphasized this right, the ample 
literature and case law regarding plea agreements have largely ignored the 
victims’ situation in plea agreements.  This is true for both before the 
enactment of the 2004 CVRA and after it.9  Pleas have become more 
visible, but the victims still remain hidden.  Despite criticism directed at the 
control of prosecutors’ and defendants’ control over the process, victims’ 
involvement has seldom been discussed as a remedy.  Notable examples of 
referring to victims’ rights under a general assessment of the CJS include 
Fletcher’s seminal book from 199510 and Bibas’ more recent call to include 
victims in the process.11  
Furthermore, Supreme Court decisions that started shaping plea 
agreements have focused on defendant’s rights, but in doing so, they 
 
 6. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 
1485-86 n. 13 (2010). Statistics of the change between 1945 and 2010: Sourcebook of 
criminal justice statistics Online, Table 5.22.2010,  http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf; Mike Work, Creating Constitutional Procedure: Frye, 
Lafler, and Plea Bargaining Reform, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 458 (2014); for a 
comparative brief review, see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Economic Analysis of Plea-
Bargaining and Prosecution, CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (N. Garoupa ed., Edward 
Elgar Pub.), June 29, 2009, at 148–49; In 1995, Fletcher commented that 90 percent of the 
cases were disposed of consensually, without trial. 
 7. For history and analysis see, Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining 
Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011). 
 8. For more information on the ascendance of victims’ interests, see Douglas E. Beloof 
& Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victims’ Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendent National 
Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2005). 
 9. See Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective 
Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1412 (2003) (criticizing Bibas’ stance).  
 10. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL 
TRIALS 189 (Addison Wesley Pub., 1995). 
 11. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 152–153 (Oxford U. Press, 
1st ed., 2012) (discussing the benefits of including victims in plea agreement negotiations in 
general terms).  
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ignored victims and their statutory rights.12  It may be presumed, then, that 
the potentially revolutionary statutory victims’ rights have not been 
exercised by many victims, and that the right to file for mandamus has not 
proved to be the anticipated effective means of ensuring compliance it was 
expected to be.13  
This article identifies the common ground between two bodies of legal 
thinking — the vast literature analyzing and criticizing plea agreements and 
the research concerning victims’ rights.  The article begins by offering 
justifications for victims’ rights participation in plea agreements, which can 
be based on intrinsic as well as instrumental arguments.  These 
justifications are broadly classified into two categories: the benefit of 
participation to the victim and the benefit to the society and the CJS.  
Consequently, victims’ participation will be advanced in this article as a 
remedy for many of the ills identified by the critics of plea agreements.  
Although such strong justifications may well lead to a call for a major legal 
change, which reflects a strong governmental duty to victims, this article 
stays within the bounds of the current legal situation.14  The article 
continues by suggesting solutions to the possible structural reasons for the 
failure of this right to be materialized.  
The methodology embodied in this article utilizes nudge theory, which 
involves choice architecture, and has rarely been applied to criminal law.  
Behavioral psychology literature recognizes that the framework in which 
an individual confronts a decision can significantly influence her decision.  
Nudge theory fits within this framework.  A nudge is any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing people’s freedom 
of choice.15 We claim that the vast discretion allocated to the repeat players 
in the CJS, on the one hand, and the time constraints that make the players 
resort to the default decisions, on the other hand — make the nudge theory 
particularly suitable to the framework of plea bargains.  The nudges require 
decision makers to make choices instead of resorting to a familiar default 
option.16 Nudge theory may be of particular importance when actors have 
yet to internalize changes (victims’ rights, in our case), and continue to 
resort to their default actions.  Thus, changing the default rule may 
contribute to a more careful execution of duties.  In accordance with this 
theory, we suggest a nudge toolbox — a toolbox that includes 
 
 12. Work, supra note 6, at 484-86; Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and 
Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 151 (2012) (reviewing Supreme Court 
decisions).  
 13. See Beloof, supra note 5, at 350–54 (2005) (terming the right “cutting edge”).   
 14. Some of the more profound proposals will be mentioned here. E.g., Cassell, supra 
note 5.  
 15. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 8 (Yale University Press. eds., 2008).  
 16. Id. at 74. 
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organizational and regulatory nudge solutions.  This toolbox will affect all 
the relevant participants in the CJS.  The advantage to this is that the 
suggestions leave the prosecutor’s and the judge’s discretion intact, while 
at the same time producing a nudge not to go directly to the default 
decision (i.e., swift sealing of plea agreements).  The possible results of 
these proposals are far reaching and include an effect on the earlier stages 
of the criminal process that is in line with the current criticism of the plea 
agreements machinery.  
Chapter 1 presents the normative and practical background to the 
victims’ place in plea agreement.  Chapter 2 elaborates on the victims’ 
rights to participate in plea agreements.  In this regard it discusses two 
categories of justifications: (1) benefits to the victim, and (2) benefit to the 
CJS and to society.  Chapter 3 provides and argues for a new framework to 
address these concerns.  The chapter begins by presenting some of the 
previous suggestions for how to best structure victims’ role in plea 
agreements.  Second, the chapter presents nudge theory and its 
compatibility to plea bargains.  Lastly, the chapter introduces the idea of 
creating a nudge toolbox in order to nudge CJS participants into allowing 
victims’ participation in plea agreements.  Chapter 4 translates the nudge 
theory into a practical toolbox.  Our basic suggestions are first, a rule that 
ensures that the process is fully documented by the prosecutor; and second, 
a default rule to which a judge will deliver a decision only after reviewing 
this document.  These proposals are designed to induce greater deliberation 
by CJS participants, which would in turn lead to a genuine discussion, 
without abolishing their discretion and freedom of choice.  The chapter 
considers and discusses a few possible counterarguments.  Chapter 5 
provides concluding remarks.   
II. VICTIMS’ PLACE IN CJS – NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL 
BACKGROUND 
At the base of victims’ rights rests a new reading of the relationship 
between the victim and the state.17  It says that while people have entrusted 
the state with the power to investigate, prosecute and punish, this monopoly 
does not entail the complete erosion of the private harm.  On the contrary, 
it is the state’s duty to uphold human rights, including those of the victim.18 
This new view of the adversary system turns the bipolar criminal process 
into a more complicated, often three-sided process that includes the victim.  
 
 17. Liliya Abramchayev, A Social Contract Argument for the State’s Duty to Protect 
from Private Violence, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. OF C.R. & ECON. DEV. 849, 853, 863 (2004); Mary 
Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, The Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to Be Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN. 
L. REV. 47, 52 (2010). 
 18. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, Ch. 4 (N.Y. U. Press 2002). 
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Both state and federal legislation have recognized the victims’ 
legitimate interest in plea agreements.  Different mechanisms of victims’ 
participation have been installed in different states and in the Federal 
system. The victims’ right to participate in plea bargains includes two 
components: the right to confer with the prosecutor during the plea 
bargaining and the right to address the court before the entering of the 
plea.19 O’Hear considered the duty of a prosecutor to consult with the 
victim a more meaningful victim participation than would be available 
through a right to speak at the plea hearing alone, as the right to express a 
view during a plea hearing would be too latent to be effective.20  However, 
presently, it is not at all clear that a right to confer would lead to a genuine 
discussion.21 
Statutory victims’ rights of participation in pleas vary widely from state 
to state. The preliminary right to confer with the prosecutor, for example, 
could either be discretionary or mandatory,22 and may include notification 
only,23 or a general right to confer.24 However, the rights may be broadly 
divided into five distinct modes of participation beyond the right to be 
informed: a right to confer with the prosecutor, a mandatory consultation 
requirement, a right to address the court (in person or in writing), and the 
federal right to appeal for a writ of mandamus where these rights have been 
breached.25 Several states have even set the rights as constitutional.26 
Importantly, the prosecution’s discretion remains intact in all cases, as it is 
not required to defer to the victims’ wishes. Generally, few procedural 
guidelines regarding the prosecutor’s responsibilities to confer with the 
victim are included in these types of state laws, leaving their 
implementation largely at the discretion of the prosecutor.27 In addition, 
most states provide no consequences for noncompliance with such laws; 
 
 19. For variations on the prosecutor’s duty to consult the victim see: BELOOF, CASSELL, 
TWIST, infra note 56, at 422.  
 20. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines., 
91 MARQUETTE L REV. 323, 324 (2007). 
 21. ANDREW SANDERS, RICHARD YOUNG & MANDY BURTON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 739 
(Oxford U. Press, 4th ed. 2010). 
 22. As proposed in the 1992 Model Victims of Crime Act, National Conference of 
Commissioner on Uniform State Law, § 203 (1992), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared 
/docs/victims%20of%20crime/uvca_final_92.pdf%20; 
www.Americanbar.org/groups/criminal_Justice/policy/index_aba_Criminal_Justice_policies
_by_meeting.html (announcing the adoption of the model law by the American Bar 
Association (ABA), 108C (CJS).). 
 23. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 611A.03 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3436, 74-7333 
(2000). 
 24. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 971.095 (2000). 
 25. For a full review of laws, see OVC Archive, OVC.COM, (Nov. 2002) https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin7/2.html#go4. 
 26. BELOOF, et al., infra note  56, at 422.  
 27. OVC Archive, OVC.COM, (Nov. 2002) https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives 
/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin7/2.html#go4. 
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crime victims are still frequently left out of the plea agreement process.28 
As implementation of victims’ rights in plea bargains changes among the 
different states, this article concentrates on the federal rights.29  
In the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), Congress has 
explicitly provided victims’ rights accompanied by standing.30  Victims, as 
participants, albeit not parties, have the rights to receive notice and “to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving 
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”31  The court “shall 
ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection 
(a)” and shall make every effort to “permit the fullest attendance possible 
by the victim . . ..”32  Prosecution and other department of justice agencies 
“shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and 
accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”33  Moreover, the victim 
may submit, and thus become a party to, a motion for relief and writ of 
mandamus, enforcing his rights in appellate court when his rights are 
denied by the trial court.34  In certain cases, the victim may make a motion 
to re-open a plea or a sentence.35  This right is not a right to veto the plea or 
that the prosecution should defer to her wishes.36  However, that victims 
should be granted an opportunity to express their views, without an 
opportunity to challenge any court decision, goes further than previous 
scholarly suggestions.37  Theoretically, the victims’ right to appeal for a 
mandamus could have presented a significant opportunity for judicial 
review.  Expectations of victims’ rights supporters have focused on the 
enforceability of the right, embodied in the resurrected writ of mandamus, 
as a remedy for rights violations.38 
For various reasons, some victims may not be interested in 
participating in the criminal process.  Yet, other victims may be satisfied 
with their participation and the fulfillment of their rights.  However, the 
current normative composition does not seem to be optimal for those 
victims who do not materialize their rights for lack of information or 
resources, or because CJS professionals still seem to turn to their default 
action of reaching pleas and sealing them without the victims’ input.  It 
 
 28. Id.  
 29. For an early review of victims’ rights in plea bargains and different state models, see 
Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 301 (1987).  
 30. S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2004) (enacted). 
 31. CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006). 
 32. Id. § 3771(b)(1). 
 33. Id. § 3771(c). For a narrow reading of this provision, see United States v. McVeigh, 
958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 34. 18 U.S.C § 3771(d)(3). 
 35. Id. § 3771(d)(5). 
 36. Courts have stressed that the CVRA does not transfer discretion to the victims. See 
e.g., United States v. Thetford, 935 F.Supp.2d 1280  (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
 37. Welling, supra note  29, at 355. 
 38. Beloof, supra note 5, at 262, 343. 
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may, of course, reflect the possibility that not all authorities have 
internalized the changes that stem from victims’ rights.  The often 
unrepresented lay victim would normally assume that the prosecutor would 
notify the court their her view.39  Economic analysis of rights can also 
explain why most victims would find vindicating the right extremely 
difficult.  The cost of vindicating the right would be prohibitively 
expensive for most victims who would have to hire an attorney to work 
alongside the prosecution and the defense attorney.40  This theory explains 
why at least some of the cases where victims sought mandamus involved 
either the prospect of high restitution, or victims who had the means to 
petition, which may include corporations or multiple victims.41 
Judges may also view victims’ rights as an unnecessary obstacle.  
Judge Posner recently observed that allowing victims to intervene in 
criminal cases in the district court: 
. . . would be a recipe for chaos.  Imagine plea bargaining in which 
intervening crime victims argue for a different bargain from that 
struck between the government and the defendant, or trials at 
which victims’ lawyers present witnesses and cross-examine the 
defendant's witnesses or participate in the sentencing hearing in 
order to persuade the judge to impose a harsher sentence than 
suggested by the prosecutor.42 
Moreover, the lack of sufficient scholarly writings discussing the 
CVRA, as well as the few published cases that have reached the courts of 
appeal, demonstrate the little influence the CVRA provisions relevant to 
victims’ rights in plea bargains have had.  This problem is the heart of this 
article, due to the importance of victims’ participation in plea agreements, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 39. Cassell, supra note 5, at 889.  
 40. The prosecution and the defense both have a litigation-cost advantage over the 
victim. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 1313 (2012). 
 41. Most of the published petitions for mandamus published in the last five years comply 
with this observation. See, e.g., In re Her Majesty the Queen in Right Of Canada. v. U.S. 
District Court, 785 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 
1234 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Stake Center Locating, Inc. v. U.S. District Court. 731 F.3d 949 
(9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Citgo Ref. & Chemicals Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. 
Tex. 2012); United States v. BP Products N. Am., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655 (S.D. Tex. 2009); 
United States v. Arctic Glacier International, Inc., http://www.appliedantitrust.com/ 
03_criminal/restitution/arctic_sdohio_vr_baron_objections2_1_2010.pdf. The petition for 
writ of mandamus was denied; See https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/ 2978860/united-
states-v-arctic-glacier-international/?q=cites%3A(1231213).  
 42. United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION IN 
PLEA AGREEMENTS  
The many justifications of victims’ involvement in plea agreements can 
be based on either intrinsic or instrumental arguments, and may be broadly 
classified into two categories: the benefit of participation to the victim, and 
the benefit to the CJS and society.  
A. THE BENEFITS TO THE VICTIMS 
The effect of a plea agreement on the particular victim is almost self-
explanatory.  Plea agreements are essentially either a dismissal or reduction 
of charges, with a presumably more lenient sentence than the defendant 
might have expected without the agreement.  All these may be major 
changes for a victim who may expect adherence to charges that reflect 
reality as she see it, followed by a certain standard of sentencing.  Nothing 
could be farther from this expectation than a non-prosecution agreement 
with an alleged perpetrator.43  A victim is likely to be interested in the finer 
points of indictment and sentence, not only in the simplistic bipolarization 
of acquittal versus conviction.  For example, for a victim of multiple sexual 
offenses, certain charges may be more meaningful than others that may be 
dropped, and restitution may be more important than long term 
imprisonment.  It was recently recognized by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal that the interests of a victim and the government in a restitution 
determination are not sufficiently similar for a finding of privity” for 
purposes of collateral estoppel.44  Furthermore, a plea agreement may have 
far reaching civil consequences for a victim who wishes to pursue 
damages, or where criminal proceedings may affect family court 
decisions.45  Hence, victims’ advocates have stressed the importance of 
participation in plea agreements since the rise of modern victims’ rights 
advocacy.46   
Varied justifications support victims’ participation in all key 
proceedings, including plea bargains, in order to advance victims’ needs 
and interests.47  As Cassell and Tribe wrote: “[t]hese are the very kinds of 
 
 43. A victim’s status has been recognized under the CVRA in this situation: Doe v. 
United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Courts have also recognized victims’ 
CVRA rights where prosecutions have not yet started.Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 
2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 44. Doe v. Hasketh, 828 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2016) (It was consequently found that the 
victim could file for civil damages. The victim was not a party to prior criminal sentencing 
proceeding, and had limited opportunity to influence process. Her participation in restitution 
process was limited to conferring with government, providing information to probation 
officer as to extent of her losses, or providing testimony to sentencing court if sentencing 
court determined that testimony was warranted.).  
 45. Id. 
 46. William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The 
Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976); Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the 
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515, 557 (1982). 
 47. The question whether rights should be limited to victims of serious offences is 
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rights with which our Constitution is typically and properly concerned — 
rights of individuals to participate in all those government processes that 
strongly affect their lives.”48  Due to the vast potential of plea agreements 
to affect the victims’ wellbeing, victim participation is doubly justified.  In 
turn, however, exclusion of the victim may lead to what is known as 
“secondary victimization,” that is, the harm caused to the victim by the 
CJS’s lack of respect and consideration.49  As early as 1977, Christie 
portrayed victims as “double losers,” by “losing” to the offender and by 
“losing” to a system that denies their rights of participation, which robs 
them of “their” conflict.50  Thus, it is not surprising that research has 
indicated the harmful effect on victims who had been excluded from plea 
bargains.51  The participation of the victim in the plea agreement has an 
ability to restore the dignity of the victim, while protecting her against 
unjust manipulation or secondary victimization.52 Indeed, the right to be 
heard on pleas has been connected to the CVRA’s open ended requirement 
that victims “be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's 
dignity and privacy.”53 A right of participation conveys vindication and 
moral recognition not only of the damage but also of the victim’s emotional 
needs, which is of particular importance where retributivism is upheld.54  
Thus, listening to the victim means hearing her authentic concerns without 
pre-guising her stance. Indeed, not all victims would necessarily push for a 
harsh sentence.55  
 
beyond the scope of this article.  “Implementation of this section is particularly important in 
serious cases: all felonies, crimes of violence, and other cases were a victim’s wellbeing is 




 48. Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the 
Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998,  reprinted in DOUGLAS E. BELLOG, PAUL G. CASSELL 
& STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 776–78 (2d ed. 2006). 
 49. Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation 
Model, UTAH L. REV. 289, 295–297 (1999).  
 50. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1977). 
 51. Edna Erez, Peter R. Ibarra & Daniel M. Downs, Victim Welfare and Participation 
Reforms in the United States: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, in THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 15 
(Edna Erez, Michael Kildhling & Jo-Anne Wemmers eds., 2011). 
 52. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 189, 192. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2006);  Cassell, supra note 5, at 886–91. 
 54. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 197. For a rejection of the notion of “private vengeance” 
as a factor, and the link between legitimate victims’ emotions and retribution, see Stephanos 
Bibas, Criminal (In)justice and Democracy in America, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 134, 140 
(2013); Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Dana Pugach, Pain, Love and Voice: The Role of 
Domestic Violence Victims in Sentencing, 18  MICH. J. GENDER & L. 423 (2012). For a brief 
presentation of the debate about retributivism between classical economic analysis of law 
and social analysis, see Mark D. White, Retributivist Justice and Dignity, in LAW AND 
SOCIAL ECONOMICS, ESSAYS IN ETHICAL VALUES FOR THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY, 77, 
78–85 (Mark D. White ed., 2014). 
 55. Dancig-Rosenberg & Pugach, supra note 54. 
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A closely related line of justifications points to the participation’s 
possible contribution to a victims’ recovery.56  Theoretic support of this 
assumption may be found in therapeutic jurisprudence theory, which 
identified the legal process as a potentially therapeutic agent for its 
audiences.  A major tenet of this theory has been the need to hear the 
victim.  Hearing the victim is a vindicating, empowering act, which 
restores a sense of control after it has been damaged by the offense.57  
Recently, positive victimology has also stressed the positive effect the 
participatory legal process may have for crime victims, while identifying 
exclusion as a negative factor.58  Participation could lead to greater victim 
satisfaction within the criminal justice system.59  Procedural justice writers 
have identified transparency, clear criteria, and participation as factors 
affecting the parties’ satisfaction with the legal process.60  Procedural 
justice theory may explain the finding that victims’ involvement in pleas 
does not necessarily complicate or prolong the process.61  Moreover, as 
early research found, the vast majority of involved victims accepted the 
sentence agreement.62  It may be, of course, that victims who are consulted 
are simply more informed about the process and its probable outcomes, 
including the legal reasons for the bargain, so their expectations are more 
realistic.63  These findings also resonate with a view of plea bargains as a 
form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), as mediation or a 
dialogue.64  If plea bargains are viewed as a “privatization” of criminal 
 
 56. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 423 (3d. ed., 2010). 
 57. DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Edna Erez, Michael Kildhling & Jo-Anne 
Wemmers, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation in Justice: An Introduction, 
in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ix (Edna Erez, Michael Kildhling & Jo-Anne Wemmers eds., 2011). 
 58. Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Dana Pugach, Between Secondary Victimization and 
Positive Victimology: The Case of Crime Victims’ Right of Privacy, in POSITIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 292–306 (Natti Ronel & Dana Segev eds., 2015). 
 59. Model Uniform Victims of Crime Act, supra note 47, at 14 (§ 203 cmt.). 
 60. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule 
Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307 (2006). Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and 
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 444 (2008); Giannini, supra note 17, at 85–103. 
 61. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Sex Offender Registration 
and Community Notification Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 213 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 
2003).  
 62. Karen Gorbach Rebrovich, Factors Affecting the Plea-Bargaining Process in Erie 
County: Some Tentative Findings, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 693 (1976-1977). See also, Wayne A. 
Krestetter & Anne M. Heinz, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in 
Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 365 (1979).  
 63. BELOOF, et. al., supra note 56. 
 64. For an analysis of plea bargains as a “privatized” ADR, see Gabriel Hallevy, The 
Defense Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 495, 499 (2009); 
Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Plea Bargaining as Dialogue, 49 AKRON L. REV. 63 (2016). While 
Hallevy and Kitai-Sangero pointed at the benefits of plea bargains as resolution for 
defendants, the same would apply to victims ù they will be better included, considered, and 
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justice, or as ADR with little judicial control, there is a strong justification 
to include all those who have stakes in the result, including the victims.  
Victims’ participation may also be justified by the theory of 
sentencing.  There is a wide agreement that the victim has a particular stake 
at sentencing, following not only from her own interest, but from the 
principle of linking the appropriate sentence to the level of harm, which is 
often the victims’ private information.65  This principle has been reflected 
not only in the CVRA but also in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
as amended in 2008.  It provided that “[b]efore imposing sentence, the 
court must address any victim of the crime who is present at sentencing and 
must permit the victim to be reasonably heard.”66  Furthermore, it is 
reflected in state constitutions and statutory schemes, which contain the 
victims’ right to have input in sentencing proceedings.67  In Payne v. 
Tennessee, the Court recognized crime victims as unique individual human 
beings whose particularized harm could be the legitimate subject of victim 
impact statements.68  Moreover, three concurring Justices — Scalia, 
O’Connor and Kennedy — acknowledged the ascendance of crime victims’ 
interests in America.69  Another judicial acknowledgment of victims’ 
interest in sentencing may be found in Calderon v. Thompson, where the 
Court observed that to unsettle expectations in the execution of moral 
judgment “is to inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate 
interests in punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and victims 
of crime alike.”70  Defendants’ claims of victims’ statements as prejudicial 
rather than relevant have been rejected.71  In fact, many victims avail 
themselves of their right to submit a victim impact statement.72 
 
their dignity will be respected. 
 65. Nuno Garoupa, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Law § 4.4 (2003), http://www 
.ppge.ufrgs.br/giacomo/arquivos/diremp/garoupa-2004.pdf.  For a different opinion, see 
FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 247–48 (contending that a victim’s opinion in relation to 
sentencing is not to be taken into consideration in determining the proper level of 
punishment, as punishment does not respond to a particular wrong as measured by the 
victim. Nevertheless, arguing that the victim’s power should be reallocated from sentencing 
to pleabargaining). 
 66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h)(i)(4)(B). 
 67. Beloof, supra note 49, at 328–29 (App. A. Collecting rights from state jurisdictions). 
Victim Impact Statements have become prevalent. A separate question is whether a victim 
can express a view about the befitting sentence. For the debate, see Annette van der 
Merwe & Ann Skelton, Victims’ Mitigating Views in Sentencing Decisions: A Comparative 
Analysis, 35 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 355, 357–59 (2015); Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of 
Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 611 (2009).   
 68. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991).  
 69. For more information on the ascendance of victims’ interests, see Beloof & Cassell, 
supra note 8. 
 70. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, at 556 (1998) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor, J. concurring).  
 71. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
526 U.S. 1007 (1999) (citing Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 589, 613 (C.D. Cal. 
1992), aff’d, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“The devastating effects that the deaths of the 
victims had on their families and loved ones is ‘certainly part and parcel of the 
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The link between plea agreements and sentencing is obvious.73  Any 
plea, whether a charge or sentencing bargain, is likely to offer the 
defendant concessions.  Pleas are one place where the state’s interest in 
timely punishment may be different then that of the victim, which leads to 
the importance of recognizing the separate interests.  Victims’ interests 
may be “profoundly injured” not only when execution of the sentence is 
significantly delayed, but when the charge or the sentence is significantly 
different to the anticipated one, and the victim is not informed about the 
reasons for it or able to express her view.  When a predetermined sentence 
is being agreed upon through the plea — it essentially turns the plea 
agreement into a sentencing proceeding less transparent and participatory 
than the one taking place in the courtroom.  Thus, recognition of the 
legitimacy of victims’ interest in sentencing adds yet another justification 
to victims’ involvement in pleas.74  For example, a victim should be able to 
express her monetary concerns where restitution may be an option.75  Not 
allowing the victim to express her view about the plea will impair her right 
to address the court at sentencing.76  Not only that, she will also not be able 
to appeal the sentence as she was not a party to the criminal proceedings, a 
fact that may lead to either frustration or lengthy and costly civil 
proceedings which could have been avoided.77 
One could argue, that there is a notable difference between sentencing 
and plea agreements.  A sentence is delivered after the defendant has been 
found guilty.  That is, the victim has been judicially recognized as a victim.  
In contrast, a plea agreement is a preliminary process, whereby the victim 
is still an alleged victim; therefore, her rights should be defined more 
cautiously.  Recognizing a victim’s stake in sentencing is easier than 
recognizing participation in earlier stages, as it follows a conviction and the 
presumption that innocence no longer applies.78  However, if victims’ 
participation is left to that late stage of the criminal trial, it may be too late, 
 
circumstances’ of the crime properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase of trial.”). 
 72. Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 5, 9 (2006). For a victim’s fight to submit victim impact statements, see, United States 
v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 73. See BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 56, at 423 (contending that the right to 
express a view in plea bargaining is implicit in the right for an input in sentencing). 
 74. Cassell, supra note 5, at 938–41. 
 75. BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 56, at 423. Restitution is the one component 
of the sentence that reflects mostly the victim’s interests. With its growing importance, an 
early victim’s involvement in a plea may reflect it and lead to a more balanced plea. It may 
also contribute to greater defendant’s realism and prevent cases such as California v. 
Ramirez, where the defendant, on appeal, was afforded an opportunity to withdraw from a 
plea and although restitution was not part of the plea, it was imposed by the court. California 
v. Ramirez, No. C068462, 2012 WL 1919481, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 29, 2012). 
Unsurprisingly, restitution is very much the only victims’ rights issue that has have been 
decided by the Supreme Court. See Paroline v. United States, 701 F. 3d 749. 
 76. People v. Stringham, 206 Cal. App. 3d 184, 196–97 (1988). 
 77. Doe v. Hasketh, 828 F.3d at 159. 
 78. Dancig-Rosenberg & Pugach, supra note 54, at 425, 428–42 (2012).   
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considering the deciding role of the plea agreement.  Clearly, the power 
that could make a difference in the life of victims lies at the beginning of 
the process, before an agreement has been accepted and sealed.79  Allowing 
the victim to express her view in relation to sentencing, only after a plea 
has been accepted, will deplete victims’ rights of much of its contents.  In 
this case, the victim’s view will have to refer to the fictitious reality often 
portrayed in the charge bargain or an agreed upon lenient sentence.  A late 
objection may be met by the possible obstacle of double jeopardy.  The 
immediateness of the mandamus allows for it.80  In addition, it has been 
argued that a trial outcome could better approximate the level of harm than 
a settlement between the criminal and the prosecutor.81  Victims’ 
involvement may contribute to this approximation, if it affects the 
negotiations between prosecution and defendant. 
B. THE BENEFITS TO CJS AND TO SOCIETY 
Victims’ participation in plea bargaining may also be beneficial to the 
CJS and even to society.  The effect of victims’ participation might be an 
answer to some criticism against plea bargains.  In the years that have 
passed since Justice White’s remarks in Brady v. United States where he 
praised plea bargains as serving everybody’s interests, criticism has grown 
in line with pleas’ dominance over the criminal process.82  Much of the 
criticism emanates from leaving what Bibas called “the shadow of the 
trial”, and looking into the realities of plea bargains.83  However, little 
attention has been drawn to the possible effect of victims’ participation in 
plea agreements as a safeguard against some of the shortcomings of this 
procedure.  
In line with the Procedural Justice Theory, victims’ participation may 
enhance perception of the fairness of an official decision, an issue often 
raised in relation to defendants.84  In turn, this perception may contribute to 
the public view of the legitimacy of the CJS as a whole, spreading from the 
victim to the public.  Ultimately, it might even have an effect on 
cooperation and compliance.85  As plea bargains already suffer from public 
distrust, undermining the CJS’s legitimacy is a point of particular 
 
 79. FLETCHER, supra note 52, at 248. 
 80. For analysis and cases, see Beloof supra note 5, at 309–16. 
 81. Garoupa, supra note 65. 
 82. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1033 (2006). 
 83. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464 (2004). See also Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Law, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 87–97, 134–37 (2005) (speaking about the 
coercion inherent in plea agreements and the prosecution’s discretion that lead to distortion 
of justice). 
 84. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 749, 772, 793, 804 (2006). 
 85. MODEL UNIFORM VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT, supra note 47, at 14 (§ 203 cmt.). 
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importance.86  Dissatisfied victims, those who feel betrayed and neglected 
by the CJS, who suffer “secondary victimization,” have been known to turn 
to the media to voice their concerns/plead their case.87  This, in turn, might 
lead to a greater loss of public trust in the CJS flowing from the secrecy of 
the bargain.  Furthermore, a frustrated victim conveys to the public a strong 
message about the immorality in the justice system.  If morality is an issue, 
and we believe it is, victims should be heard meaningfully heard.88 
At the very basic level, in many cases, the victim has the potential to 
supply information.  It has been claimed that a prosecutorial approach to 
plea agreements is based on seeing the system as a whole and trying to 
maximize resources in order to further purposes, including deterrence.89  
The victim brings the angle that focuses on the details of the particular 
case.  She may thus illuminate points that may have escaped the prosecutor.  
Another possible benefactor of the victim’s involvement may then be the 
defendant, whose resistance may be penetrated after hearing the victim’s 
point of view.90  As the court held in U.S. v. B.P. Products, “[i]t is also true 
. . . that resourceful input from victims and their attorneys could facilitate 
the reaching of an agreement.”91  
However, the victim’s contribution might be even more meaningful.  In 
a system controlled by the prosecution, and to a point the defense counsel, 
the victim’s review of the agreement may be crucial as a welcomed 
contribution.  Furthermore, it has been pointed that judges typically lack 
sufficient information to make an informed decision about the defendant’s 
guilt.92  As victims sometimes claim, the prosecution and the defense hold 
the evidentiary materials and present a selective set of the facts.93  
Information may be deliberately withheld by prosecution and defense, both 
of whom are interested in a prompt resolution.94  The basic adversarial 
 
 86. Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public Support?, 50 
CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 590–91 (2004). BELOOF, et al., supra note 56, at 423. 
 87. Wright, supra note 83, at 80–81. 
 88. Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2003). Beloof, supra note 5. 
 89. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 289 (1983). Easterbrook justified prosecutorial discretion by economic analysis as 
a means of allowing prosecutors to maximize deterrence under limited resources. 
 90. A similar idea was suggested by Bibas who regarded eading of the trial as a morality 
play, conveying moral messages. See Bibas, supra note 88, at 1431 (2003).  
 91. United States v. Kaufman, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 3142561 (D. New London) 
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/syllabi/gorsuch/United%20States%20v.%20Kaufman.p
acket.pdf; BP, supra note 41.  (finding that there was a pre-charge conferral right and that it 
had been violated, but a remedy was not granted). 
 92. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2122 (1998).  
 93. See Victims’ Objections to Plea Agreement and Request that it be Rejected in United 
States v. Arctic Glacier Int’l, Inc., supra note 41.   
 94. A question that is not within the scope of the current article is whether the victim 
should have a right to review the evidentiary material prior to expressing a view about a plea 
so that the victim may give an informed opinion. For a discussion of information 
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presumption that the contest between the parties leads to the truth could 
very well be revoked.95  As Sanders, Young, and Burton stated, “the search 
for truth (whoever’s version that may be) is subordinated to other priorities; 
thus the system is exclusionary to both the defendant and the victim.”96  
The victim may offer the judge another source of information and a 
different perspective before the plea is sealed.  This aspect is particularly 
important in a system where the judge has no direct access to relevant 
information.97  That is not to say that the judge should accept any victim’s 
statement.  However, it may lead the judge to require further information 
from the prosecution before sealing the plea, leading the judge to not 
automatically resort to the default option of accepting the plea.  Perhaps it 
could lead to a shift, even if only slightly, towards accuracy and away from 
dishonest pleas.98  If there is a public interest in the truth, victims’ 
participation may contribute to getting closer to the truth.  
The victim may possibly be taking upon herself the crucial feature of 
defense attorneys in the adversarial system, according to Schulhofer, to 
“sow doubt” about all aspects of the legal system.99  The prosecution will 
then face the need to defend the bargain, not just present it to the judge.  In 
this, our view adds to those scholars who have claimed that judges should 
take a more active role in plea bargains as a means of minimizing their ills, 
often argued from an economic analysis point of view.100  It also fits with 
the view of judges’ participation as a form of mediation.101  It has even 
been suggested that, in certain cases, it is the public that has a special 
interest in knowing facts, beyond the “monosyllabic guilty plea.”102 
It means that the vast criticism directed at the prosecutions almost 
unhindered discretion is very important to this argument.103  This discretion 
 
asymmetry, see Bibas, supra note 83, at 2494–95. For a review of disclosure in the context 
of pleas, see Bibas, supra note 7, at 1133–35. 
 95. For the debate about the “truth finding” capability of the adversary system, see Gary 
Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121–24 (1987).  
 96. SANDERS, YOUNG & BURTON, supra note 21, at 743. 
 97. Usually, the factual basis is supplied by the prosecution, sometimes even when the 
defendant denies it. Ross, supra note 1, at 721. In certain cases, for example sexual offences 
cases, the victim may have more information than in others, such as homicide cases, where 
family members are not always witnesses. 
 98. For accuracy as a neglected value in a plea bargains driven system, see Bibas, supra 
note 90, at 1426. 
 99. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1104 
(1984). 
 100. See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295 
(2006) (supporting a partial ban where a judge could forbid a plea in weaker cases); Bibas, 
supra note 83, at 2542.   
 101. Gazal-Ayal & Riza, supra note 6, at 165. 
 102. Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the 
Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 576 (1996). 
 103. Strengthened by the lack of compulsory prosecution, an issue beyond the scope of the 
current article. For a brief comparative review of prosecution’s discretion, see Gazal-Ayal & 
Riza, supra note 6, at 145, 146–47. 
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is strengthened by the fact that, under the current regime, when presented 
with a plea, the judge does not take part in the bargaining.104  The judge 
may look at the factual basis of the plea, and whether the defendant entered 
it knowingly and voluntarily, but not more than that.105  Federal trial courts’ 
judges have a broad discretion to accept or reject a negotiated plea 
bargain.106  However, even looking at the factual basis may be a 
considerable task, when lacking information.  This situation is strengthened 
by the fact that judges, too, may be interested in quick settlements rather 
than long trials.107  Hence, pleas are usually accepted.  Pleas are agreed to 
far away from public scrutiny, without transparency and the advantages of 
a public hearing, where their justification in court is minimal.  Criticism 
has been directed from defendants’ point of view as well, as the defendant 
has the option to go to trial.  However, that is a risk, considering that, if 
found guilty, he may be sentenced more harshly.108  Even worse, this 
discretion put an enormous burden on the appellant, should she decide to 
appeal.109  
This kind of discretionary justice may be seen as ‘opportunism’ and the 
idea offends the rule of law.110  Furthermore, the lack of structural 
oversight means that prosecutors perform a quasi-judicial role unreviewed, 
de facto abolishing the separation of powers. As Barkow put it, “the 
potential for arbitrary enforcement is high” with more potential for harming 
rights in criminal law than in administrative law.111  In the criminal process, 
the prosecution’s power is the most threatening, Barkow’s argument 
emphasizes the need to rethink the prosecution’s discretion in pleas.112  
Barkow has asserted this from a point of view stressing defendant’s rights, 
but it can easily be applied to victims’ rights as well.  Perhaps, even more 
poignantly, due to the weaker position of victims in the process.  To this 
argument we may add Mashaw’s proposal that administrative decisions 
 
 104. Albert Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1059 (1976). 
 105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1)-(3); Barkow, supra note 82, at 1026; Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 106. FED. R. CRIM. P. It has been decided that the rule does not contravene a judge’s 
discretion to reject a plea, nor does it define the criteria for acceptance or rejection. US v. 
Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 107. Gazal-Ayal & Riza, supra note 6, at 165. An early research found that in the English 
CJS, too, defendants were pressurized to plead guilty: JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL 
MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY 45, 103 (1977). 
 108. Barkow, supra note 82  at 1027.  
 109. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458, 464 (1996). 
 110. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 191.  
 111. Barkow, supra note 82, at 1027. For the advantages of applying administrative rules 
on the CJS, see also Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality: 
Reclaiming Administrative Insights in Enforcement Review, 12 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIBR. & CIV. 
RTS. 43-99 (2006) (demonstrating by the test case of selective enforcement and racial 
profiling). 
 112. A bigger problem may be posed by a prosecutorial decision not to press charges, but 
that is beyond the scope of the current article. 
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should be assessed by their impact on the participants, not only by their 
“reasonableness.”113  Mashaw’s dignitary theory, when applied to victims, 
would mean that prosecution’s use of its discretion should be criticized 
when it harms the victim’s interest unjustifiably.   
Another aspect of plea bargains that may benefit from victims’ 
involvement is the agency problem of elected and nonelected prosecutors 
— the misrepresentation of public interests.114  Fletcher argues that the 
undefined “interest of the state” is exaggerate and that it is often reduced to 
the prosecution’s immediate needs or even the prosecutor’s personal 
political needs.115  As prosecutors’ private and political interests may affect 
their position in plea agreements, victims’ interests may sometimes align 
closer with those of the public.116  As when considering the agreement, the 
judge should act in the public’s interest.  Victims’ participation — as 
another form of checks and balances — may contribute to a greater 
adherence to public interest.  Along the same lines, O’Hear argued that 
victim participation in plea bargaining might actually advance, rather than 
undermine, public interests in crime control and just punishment.117 We 
may add that the victim may have a particular interest in the accuracy of 
the outcome, in that justice should be done with the person who harmed 
him.  If a plea bargain is necessary, it should be conducted fairly and, with 
the due consideration of the victims whose complaint initiates the 
process.118  
In sum victims’ participation, which may be regarded as a major 
departure from the adversarial system, may actually help to restore many of 
the adversarial system’s advantages, forsaken under a plea bargains regime. 
Furthermore, victim’s participation may add transparency to an otherwise 
opaque process.   
IV. NEW FRAMEWORK FOR VICTIM’S PARTICIPATION 
In the last two chapters, we analyzed the overall importance of victims’ 
participation in plea bargains, the existing normative framework and the 
gap between the seemingly progressive legislation and its surprisingly 
small impact on the legal arena.  Next, we turn to a brief review of some 
 
 113. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 
B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981). The right of due process is at the center of Mashaw’s argument. 
The question whether victims enjoy such right is beyond the scope of this article, but should 
be mentioned here as a point for future discussion. 
 114. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble With Trials; The Trouble With Us, 105 YALE L.J. 
825 (1995). See also Gazal-Ayal & Riza, supra note 6, at 152, 158 (stressing that much of 
the relevant economic literature has concentrated on tools to control potential deviations of 
prosecutors from the public interest). 
 115. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 192. 
 116. Bibas, supra note 83, at 2470–86. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus 
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 UNI. OF PENN. REV. 101, 138 (2009).  
 117. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 323.  
 118. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 191. 
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suggested solutions that have been offered in literature, and suggest a new 
framework for victims’ participation.  
A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE LACKING VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION  
Several suggestions have been made as to how best to structure the 
victim’s role in plea agreements, mostly before the 2004 CVRA.  For 
example, a very early proposal suggested private prosecution as a remedy 
for prosecutorial inaction.119  This is mainly relevant in cases where the 
prosecution fails to bring charges.  Such proposals are less than tempting, 
considering the many benefits of the state-run criminal process. Among 
them is the undue burden that may be inflicted on a victim who has to 
conduct her own process.120  A solution should then be found within the 
CJS.  O’Hear suggested mandatory consultation and prosecutorial 
guidelines as a victims’ rights measure.121  It seems that the most radical 
proposal has been Fletcher’s, who supported giving victims the right to 
veto a plea agreement as a full party to the proceedings.122 This suggestion 
may trigger the common concern when victims’ rights are discussed, 
blurring the line between “private vengeance” and public interest.123  The 
idea of victims’ right to veto a plea agreement has been opposed, as the 
prosecution should be free to act ‘in the interest of the state.’124  
Furthermore, it could lead to pressure on the victim.  
We suggest a different framework intended to bring a simpler solution.  
In this framework, we use nudge theory, which strikes a delicate balance 
between private and public regulation by paternalistically nudging people 
through a choice-architecture that does not eliminate or reduce freedom of 
choice.125  Nudge theory is supposed to suggest simple solutions to the 
complicated problem of the lacking cooperation of the crime victims in the 
plea agreements, while not compromising the freedom of choice of the 
other actors in the criminal procedure.    
 
 119. Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 
YALE L.J. 209 (1955). 
 120. The same rational will lead to a dismissal of alternative proceedings as a replacement 
to the criminal process, a solution to the CJS’s failures: Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional 
Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L. 
REV. 63, 97–107 (1984). 
 121. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 323.  
 122. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 193, 247.  
 123. Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1606–07 
(1996).  
 124. ABA, Model law, op.cit. comment. Supra note 59; Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? 
Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1606-07 (1996); State of Oregon v. McDonnell, 
794 P.2d 780 (Or. 1990). 
 125. Jin-Won Jung, Nudging Websites: A Proposal for a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme to 
Enforce Online Copyright 8 ISJLP 149, 153 (2012).  
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B. NUDGE THEORY AND ITS COMPATIBILITY TO PLEA BARGAINS 
According to the Behavioral Law and Economics field of research, 
analysis of law should be linked with what we have learned about human 
behavior and choice.126  Thus, the task is to explore how “real people” 
differ from homo economicus, namely from the notion that people think or 
choose unfailingly well (hereinafter: “Econs”).  People can be said to 
display bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest 
that draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable 
preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of 
information.127  It is now well established that people make decisions on 
the basis of heuristic devices or rules of thumb that can lead to systematic 
errors, and that people display various biases and aversions that can lead to 
inaccurate perceptions.128  Thus, the understanding of “real people” 
behavior should have a bearing on law.  
Nudge theory goes within this framework.  A nudge is any factor that 
significantly alters the behavior of humans, even though Econs would 
ignore it.  Econs respond primarily to incentives.  Humans respond to 
incentives too, but they are also influenced by nudges.129  The false 
assumption of the theorists of nudge challenge, is that people make choices 
that are in their best interest or at the very least are better than the choices 
that would be made by someone else.  Hence, nudge theory involves choice 
architecture and claim that a certain degree of paternalism should be 
acceptable even to those who embrace freedom of choice most.130  Thus, a 
nudge is any aspect of choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives.131 
Behavioral economists generally focus on the mean, not the end.  Their 
goal is to create choice architecture that will make it more likely that 
people will promote their own ends as they themselves understand them.132  
Moreover, behavioral economists generally favor soft rather than hard 
paternalism (a jail sentence and a fine count as hard paternalism, whereas a 
disclosure policy, a warning and a default rule count as soft paternalism).133  
Thus, nudges generally fall in the categories of means paternalism and soft 
 
 126. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (ed. by Cass R. 
Sunstein, 2000) 1, 2. 
 127. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (ed. by Cass R. Sunstein, 2000) 
11, 14.   
 128. Sunstein, supra note 126, at 3. 
 129. RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE – IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009) 8.  
 130. Id. at 11.  
 131. Id. at 6.  
 132. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (Yale 
University Press, 2012) 19.  
 133. Id. at 20.  
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paternalism.134  However, paternalistic interventions are better understood 
in terms of a continuum from hardest to softest, with the points marked in 
accordance to the magnitude of the costs imposed on choosers by choice 
architects.135 
People need nudges for decisions that are difficult, for which they do 
not get prompt feedback, and when they have trouble translating aspects of 
the situation into terms that they can easily understand.136  While required 
choice is sometimes the best way to go, people would much prefer to have 
a good default, especially when choice is complicated, difficult and 
complex.137  In circumstances with high decision costs, possible choice 
fatigue, or a low probability of undesirable consequences, research suggests 
that decision makers are likely to choose a default option that allows them 
to devote minimal energy to their decisions.138 
Plea agreements are the paradigm case of complicated decisions, in 
which the decision makers suffer from time constraints and tend to choose 
the default option.  The repetitive actors in the game are the prosecutors 
and the judges. The prosecutors have many cases to deal with and they tend 
to make the plea agreements in order to facilitate the need to administer the 
trial and the case evidence.  The judge needs to decide quickly and tends to 
choose the default option of approving the agreement, which allows her to 
devote minimum energy to the decision.  The victim, for whom the case is 
the “only case,” is forgotten.  Not only is this an infringement upon her 
rights, but she also does not have the chance to challenge the process and 
add some questions to the equation.  As Michael O’Hear stressed,  
by this point in the criminal process, the plea agreement has 
already gained considerable momentum, and even when the 
victims raise significant concerns, the judge may be quite reluctant 
to reject the agreement, which would require everyone to expand 
more effort on a case that otherwise appeared ripe for prompt 
solution.139  
Choice architecture can help induce greater deliberation by actors and 
is especially important for changing routine behaviors.  Deliberation can 
facilitate a critical thought that gives actors a pause before engaging in 
habitual behaviors and can thereby alter actors’ perspectives on how 
particular tasks should be performed.  Such deliberation can be prompted 
by nudges that require actors to make choices instead of resorting to a 
familiar default option.  Creating nudges that force actors to make choices 
 
 134. SUNSTEIN, supra note 132, at 20. 
 135. Id. at 56–57.  
 136. THALER  & SUNSTEIN, supra note 129, at 74.  
 137. Id. at 88–89.  
 138. Michael P. Kenstowicz, The Imposition of Discretionary Supervised Release 
Conditions: Nudging Judges to Follow the Law 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1446 (2015).  
 139. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 324.  
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is particularly significant when an actor intends to deviate from routine 
behaviors but experiences significant time constraints.140  
Law meets nudging in two sets of circumstances.  The first 
circumstance is when private entities nudge their customers, employees or 
donors into desired behavior (buying more, walking more, giving more 
money.)  The second circumstance occurs when public entities themselves 
seek to nudge citizens into certain behavior.  This typically requires 
legislation, regulation, or authorization.141  
The current state of affair does not offer an accommodating climate for 
victims’ participation.142  However, as explained, the value of victims’ 
participation in the process is not only in their ability to express their 
interests.  A great value lies in the chance to induce greater deliberation by 
CJS’s professionals and a deviation from routine behavior, i.e., a prompt 
acceptance of plea agreements.  Equally important, it can also offer a 
meaningful safeguard on the prosecutorial discretion.  In other words, CJS 
professionals should be nudged into including victims in the proceedings, 
and victims should be nudged to fulfill their rights.  Hence, we continue 
with suggesting a nudge toolbox intended to make the repeated participants 
in the CJS take into account the victim’s opinion in plea-bargains. 
V. NUDGE TOOLBOX 
An optimal nudge toolbox will address the prosecutors, the judge and 
the victim.  The toolbox will not amend the contents of the statutory 
victims’ rights in plea agreements, but is aimed at effecting the way those 
rights are administered by structuring the discretion of the other 
participants in the CJS in accordance to the principles outlined in the 
previous chapter.  The nudge toolbox will impose some seemingly minor 
duties on the CJS’s participants, which will not diminish their discretion, 
but instead induce greater deliberation.  In that, the toolbox will be a 
mechanism of architecture of human behavior in order to subtly shift the 
parties towards a better inclusion of victims in the process.  The following 
suggestions do not require an amendment of the CVRA, but they highlight 
the importance of amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.143  
 
 
 140. THALER  & SUNSTEIN, supra note 129, at 88–89. 
 141. Anne-Lisse Sibony & Alberto Alemanno, The Emergence of Behavioral Policy-
Making: A European Perspective in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1, 10–
11 (Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lisse Sibony ed., 2015).  
 142. O’Hear, supra note 20. 
 143. Two previous amendments have referred to victims, in a roundabout way: The 1974 
amendment that justified pleas as they “may protect the innocent victim of a crime against 
the trauma of direct and cross-examination,” and the 1985 amendment providing that the 
defendant be notified of the courts’ power to order restitution. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. In this 
our suggestion follows early meaningful calls to amend the rules, notably that of Cassell. 
See Cassell, supra note 5. 
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The CVRA provides a broad framework for victims’ participation, 
allowing the victim ‘to be heard’ without regulating the details of this right.  
It does not elaborate on the right to confer with the prosecutor or the right 
to be heard in court.  In addition, it requires the prosecutor to make the 
‘best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the 
rights,’ which is yet another requirement set in vague terms.144  Thus, it 
may be claimed that the CVRA provides standards that are general in 
nature, and rules that are needed to make the rights operative.145  Kaplow 
found that  
[T]he central factor influencing the desirability of rules and 
standards is the frequency with which a law will govern 
conduct.  If conduct will be frequent, the additional costs 
of designing rules — which are borne once — are likely to 
be exceeded by the savings realized each time the rule is 
applied.”146  
Hence, since plea agreements dominate the CJS – rules are needed to 
provide and assure victims’ participation.  
As mentioned above, the federal rules were slightly amended in 2008 
to require judges to provide victims present in court the opportunity to be 
heard during sentencing.14766 However, the CVRA Subcommittee of the 
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee, rejected these suggestions, (notably 
Cassell’s), to meaningful amendments of victims’ rights related rules.148 
Cassell argued that the Advisory Committee should broaden its vision of 
the proper role for crime victims and recommended far more expansive 
victim protections in order to comply with the CVRA.149  Such 
amendments would have also affected victims’ rights in plea bargains.  The 
Subcommittee’s reluctance emanated from its decision that “they should be 
somewhat conservative in their approach and not create rights beyond those 
provided by the Act.”150  The price of this conservatism is that there are 
articulable provisions in law without the preconditions to enforce them.  
Thus, the CVRA provisions become much less meaningful than they could 
be, and victims’ interests are not reflected as well as they should be.  
 
 144. CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006). 
 145.  For the distinction between standards and rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 121–137 (1961); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules,  3609 FACULTY 
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 14–46 (1967); Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 
YALE L.J. 823, 846–47 (1972).   
 146. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
621 (1992). 
 147. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h)(i)(4)(B). 
 148. Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules Minutes (Oct. 24 & 25, 2005, Santa Rosa, 
California) at www.uscourts.gov/file/14793/download. 
 149. Cassell, supra note 5, at 886–91. 
 150. Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules Minutes, supra note 148.  
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The advantage of a nudge toolbox is that it will not confine the 
prosecutor’s discretion, since it keeps the current boundaries of the 
discretion intact.151  As Kahan explained, “norms stick when lawmakers try 
to change them with ‘hard shoves’ but yield when lawmakers apply ‘gentle 
nudges.’”152  The tools will nudge the prosecutor to approach the victim, 
inform her and give her a meaningful opportunity to express her view prior 
to sealing the plea.  Not only will it make the fulfillment of the right to 
confer and express a view more precise, it will also ascertain that the 
provisions are enforced.  
Our basic suggestions are first, a rule that ensures that the process is 
fully documented;153 and secondly, a default rule according to which a 
judge will deliver a decision only after reviewing this document.154  
As for the prosecution, right from the very early stages of plea 
negotiations, documenting all contact with the victim in writing will 
necessitate a significant degree of attention and consideration.  As Kellogg 
stressed, writing is a special form of thinking, the making of meaning.155  
Kellogg even regarded “thinking and writing as twins of mental life.”156  
The prosecutor will have to record her communication with the victim, and 
will, eventually, file a certification of compliance to the court.  This 
document will include answers to five questions: 
1. Is it a “victim offense”? 
2. Have the best efforts been made to inform the victim 
about the plea agreement and her right to express a 
view? 
3. Has the victim been heard prior to the sealing of the 
plea agreement?  If not — why?  
4. If the victim expressed her view — what was it?157 
5. Has the victim’s view been taken into consideration 
when deciding the plea agreement?  
 
 151. The purpose of confining discretion is to keep discretionary power within designated 
boundaries. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE – A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 97 
(1971).  
 152. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000).  
 153. Cf. Kenstowicz, supra note 138, at 1443 (suggesting in relation to conditions of 
release from prison, to omit standard conditions from form AO-245B, in order to nudge 
sentencing judges to actively consider and rewrite the standard conditions imposed on 
particular defendants). 
 154. Default rules are a tool of choice in behavioral toolbox. See Sibony & Alemanno, 
supra note 141, at 14. For an overview of default rules as tools, see Eric J. Johnson & 
Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 
417, 417–18 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).  
 155. RONALD T. KELLOGG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITING  3 (1999).  
 156. Id. at 13.  
 157. In several states, the court is required to accept the prosecution’s certification that it 
conferred with the victim or that an effort was made, before the plea may be accepted. 
However, it does not necessarily include the content of the victim’s view. See Bloof, et al., 
supra note 56, at 423. 
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Thus, the prosecutor will be less likely to resort to the easy option of 
reaching a quick plea bargain.  The simple task of filing a form will lead to 
a more deliberate process.  Moreover, it is likely not only to promote the 
victims’ participation at the later stages, but the victims’ view will tend to 
affect the preliminary plea bargains negotiations.  
The implementation of victims’ rights at the initial stage of 
negotiations is of particular importance.  It may be claimed, as O’Hear did, 
that expressing a victim’s view in court may be too late, as the plea has 
already gathered momentum.158  O’Hear rightly contended that the judge 
might be quite reluctant to reject the agreement, even where the victim 
raises significant reservations.  The defendant, too, is likely to take it into 
consideration when negotiating the plea, as well as the prosecution. 
Coupled with the mentioned research that found that victims’ involvement 
in pleas led to greater levels of victims’ satisfaction, we argue that 
meaningful victims’ rights will eventually lead to more balanced pleas by 
taking into consideration victims’ as well as defendants’ interests, so that it 
would not necessarily lead to more contentions in court.159  
The need to file the document will ensure, in effect, that the prosecutor 
shall make reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider 
the victims' views about, any proposed plea negotiations.160  Thus, it helps 
to implement not only a victim's right to be heard at plea proceedings, but 
also the vaguely defined right to “confer with the attorney for the 
government” and to be “treated with fairness.”  As the overwhelming 
majority of federal criminal cases are resolved by a plea, a conference 
between the victim and the prosecutor regarding the plea will be critical in 
most cases. Many state laws that direct prosecutors to consult with victims 
have recognized this.161  
As for the victim, she is more likely to know about her rights when 
approached by the prosecutor, thus the suggestion advances the 
implementation of the victims’ right to be heard regarding a plea.  If she so 
chooses, she may be heard.  If she is not interested, it would not be for lack 
of means, representation or any other immaterial factor. 
The judge, in her turn, according to the new default rule we suggest, 
will need to consider the prosecutors’ certificate of compliance before 
deciding about sealing the agreement.  Thus, the default rule is that 
agreement is not approved without knowing the opinion of the victim.  The 
 
 158. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 324. 
 159. Some research has found that a considerable number of victims who have been 
involved in plea bargains had been satisfied with the outcome. Rebrovich, supra note 62. 
 160. Cassell, supra note 5, at 888. 
 161. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06 (2013) (“If the prosecutor fails to confer with 
the victim at any of those times, the court, if informed of the failure, shall note on the record 
the failure and the prosecutor’s reasons for the failure”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4419 
(2016). 
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suggestion conforms with Cassell’s proposition that prosecutors and 
victims' attorneys should be required to advise the court whenever they are 
aware that the victim objects to a proposed plea agreement.162  It also 
follows the logic behind Cassell’s proposition that the court should address 
any victim present when a plea is taken to determine whether the victim 
wishes to make a statement and to consider the victim's view before 
accepting a plea.163  The suggested toolbox is also in line with defendants’ 
rights advocates who call to forbid guilty pleas at first appearance, thus 
allowing the defendants, as well as the victim, time to react.164 
Our proposal for a judiciously used court certification can achieve the 
same goals by using “softer” means.  It, too, will eliminate the uncertainty 
that emanates from the fact that many victims lack the assistance of 
counsel, and thus ensures that the victim's right to be heard is vindicated.  
As the experience in several states shows, “[c]ourt certification of 
compliance efforts provides a system of checks and balances that can help 
preserve victims’ consultation rights without placing undue burden on the 
criminal justice process.”165  It will put into effect the implicit obligation of 
the CVRA that the prosecutors will communicate a victim's objection to the 
court.166  
Furthermore, as in the case of the prosecutors, it will presumably nudge 
the judges into allocating the victim’s view a more thorough consideration 
in her decisions.  As we explained, one of the basic current problems in 
pleabargains is that judges do not possess any information beyond that 
which is given to them when the plea is presented.  Our proposal makes it 
more likely that the judge, retaining her full discretion, will be exposed to 
the victim’s viewpoint and the questions that might arise.167 
One might argue that the proposed solution is too soft and may leave 
intact the situation whereby the prosecution presents the court with a 
selective version of the truth, aimed at promoting the plea agreement.  In a 
sense it can be compared to the critique of another nudge tool — disclosure 
requirements.  These are meant to inform, not displace, people’s 
 
 162. Cassell, supra note 5, at 889. 
 163. Cassell,  at 886-91. 
 164. Bibas, supra note 7, at 1155. A similar point, from defendants’ point of view, was 
made by Work in relation to “exploding offers.” See Work, supra note 6, at 486. 
 165. OVC Archive, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin 
7/2.html#go4. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4423 (2000). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 
1173 (2000). 
 166. See State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (2002) (holding that the prosecutor was obliged, as 
an officer of the court, to inform the court about the victim’s wish to be heard in opposition 
to a plea). 
 167. United States v. BP Products North America Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 727 (2009) 
(“The purpose of the conferral right is not to give the victims a right to approve or 
disapprove a proposed plea in advance or to participate in the plea negotiations. The purpose 
of the reasonable right to confer is for victims to provide information to the government, 
obtain information from the government, and to form and express their views to the 
government and court.”).   
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understanding of which choices will promote their welfare.  As Sunstein 
pointed out, the complexities are first, a selective disclosure of information 
will often affect the understanding; and second, the framing of information 
matters.168 However, the suggested nudge toolbox is likely to diminish the 
extent of the existing problem.  Our suggestion is also in line with Work’s 
analysis that accountability and institutional design are more promising 
reforms than external regulation of the prosecution.169  If lessons can be 
learned from the different realms that nudge tools have been used in — we 
can be cautiously optimistic.170  
However, we should be aware of the fact that some nudges are 
ineffective, or at least less effective than expected.  In a recent article,171 
Sunstein identifies two reasons why this might be so: strong contrary 
preferences on the part of the chooser, who will therefore opt out, and 
counter-nudges in the form of compensating behavior on the part of those 
whose interests are at stake.172  The CJS system has a strong preference to 
seal agreements.  There is also a risk that the default rule will influence the 
desired conduct (judges will demand the documents), but it will also 
produce a compensating behavior, in that judges will easily approve the 
agreements because the victims have been heard.  This compensation will 
nullify the overall effect.173  
Since architecture of human behavior may be unpredictable, a solution 
should be evidence based.  Therefore, the proposal should be the subject of 
a pilot program, and be assessed and reviewed.  Sunstein offers three 
answers to nudge failure:  doing nothing, trying a different kind of nudge, 
or undertaking a more aggressive approach, or going beyond a nudge.174 
Indeed, when third-party effects are involved, in our case the victims, the 
ineffectiveness of nudges provides a good reason to consider stronger 
measures.175  In any case, if the pilot of the nudge toolbox does not work, at 
least we will gain important knowledge about the participants’ behavior, 
enabling a new consideration. 
 
 168. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM  85 
(2012). 
 169. Work, supra note 6, at 158. 
 170. See, e.g., Karsten Schmidt et al., Nudging Smoke In Airports: A Case Study in 
Nudging as A Method, INUDGEYOU, http://inudgeyou.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
08/Nudging-Smoke-in-Airports.pdf; DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT (2015) 
(describing seemingly small and subtle solutions that have led to huge improvements across 
tax, healthcare, pensions, employment, crime reduction, energy conservation, and economic 
growth). 
 171. Cass. R. Sunstein, Nudge that Fail (preliminary draft July 18, 2016), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2809658. 
 172. Id. at 2.  
 173. Cf.  d. at 19. 
 174. Id. at 4. 
 175. Id. at 20.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Currently the federal law (CVRA) provides victims with meaningful 
rights of participation.  The proposals made in this article are meant to 
bridge the gap between these seemingly sufficient rights and a reality in 
which victims might still be marginalized.  This gap may be explained by 
the prosecution’s vast discretion and dominance in the process.  At the 
same time, victims are powerless to enforce their rights to participate, and 
this powerlessness eliminates the potential for true confrontation. 
An example of the importance of involving victims in plea agreements, 
have recently been given in a Utah child abuse case.  A judge refused to 
accept a plea where the victims’ parents had not been allocated the right to 
confer with the prosecutor and a very lenient plea had been struck behind 
their back.176  Judge Randall Skanchy rejected the agreement after the 
mothers of the three children voiced their objections to the deal and 
described the injuries their children had suffered.  One of the mothers 
voiced frustration with the prosecutors and praised the judge's decision: “I 
think he actually listened to us”, she said, “we haven't gotten questions 
answered from day one, we’ve just been passed off.”177  Another mother 
said that in light of the injury to her daughter and the others, she did not 
believe the plea deal was strong enough, but she would have supported a 
plea deal with sufficient consequences and an admission of guilt.178 
This story demonstrates the core issues analyzed in this article.  Despite 
the existence of statutory victims’ rights, and the importance of victims’ 
involvement in pleas for the victims, for the CJS and for society — victims 
are still not always perceived as rightful participants.  The mothers’ 
complaints exemplify the secondary victimization caused by their 
exclusion from the process.  The judge’s acceptance of their reservations 
and the resulting rejection of the plea demonstrates the value of information 
and the results of the lack of it.  The rejection of the plea emphasizes that 
defendants do not have a legitimate right in the lower sentence offered by a 
plea, when it is an unduly favorable bargain, resting on partial 
information.179  Perhaps most importantly though, the mother’s heartfelt 
statement shows that victims do not necessarily oppose plea agreements.  
They only want to take part in the process and voice their concerns.    
As a solution, we turn to nudge theory, which has almost never been 
used in criminal law, but is particularly advantageous for the discussed 
issue.  Nudge theory involves choice architecture and claims that a certain 
 
 176. See McKenzie Romero, Judge Rejects No-Jail Plea Deal for Day Care Operator 
Charged with Abusing 3 Toddlers, DESERT NEWS (June 14, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://m.deseret 
news.com/article/865656220/Judge-rejects-no-jail-plea-deal-for-day-care-operator-charged-
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degree of paternalism should be acceptable even to those who most 
embrace freedom of choice.  Thus, a nudge is any aspect of choice 
architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or abolishing their discretion.  Choice architecture 
can help to induce greater deliberation by actors and is especially important 
for changing routine behaviors.  We argue that deliberation can facilitate a 
critical thought by the prosecutors and the judges, and can alter their 
perspectives on how plea bargains should be performed, from the initial 
negotiations to the court.  
For that reason, we suggested the development of a nudge toolbox that 
will nudge the prosecutor to approach the victim, inform her, and give her a 
meaningful opportunity to express her view prior to sealing the plea.  The 
main rules we suggested ensure that the process is fully documented and 
that a decision is made only following the presentation of this document.  
The rules do not alter the prosecutor’s discretion but structures its 
administration.  Recording all contact with the victim will necessitate a 
significant degree of attention and consideration, and will diminish the 
tendency to resort to the default option of sealing quick agreements.  The 
judge too operates in circumstances, where she is likely to resort to the 
default option of a swift approval of agreements.  These circumstances 
include the case load and the need to deliver decisions in due time.  Being 
presented with structured information regarding the victim’s view will lead 
the judge to a more deliberate decision, without limiting her discretion.  
This apparently simple and minor change, has a potential to make 
major contribution towards the implementation of the broadly defined 
CVRA rights and to the inclusion of victims in plea agreements.  
Furthermore, it will answer some of the strongest critiques of plea bargains 
by making the process more transparent.  This will not necessarily lead to 
fewer plea agreements, but it will hopefully lead to more balanced ones, 
reflecting all the relevant interests.  The prosecution and the defendant will 
have an interest in reaching an agreement that will not be rejected by the 
court.  Thus, victim input may contribute to what may be seen as a fairer 
conclusion of the plea agreement. 
 
 
 
